Scholars have been investigating the quick emergence of digital platforms, essentially through the lens of digital native firms. If there is limited occurrence of platforms launched by incumbent firms such as Daimler (Car2Go, Moovel) or Johnson Controls (Panopix), the economics of their strategic responses through platforms by incumbents merit attention. This paper provides the first largescale empirical evidence on the incidence, nature and profitability of incumbent platforms. Our contribution is threefold: (1) only 10 to 30% of incumbent firms have already engaged in some platform play, with substantial heterogeneity across industries, however; (2) incumbent firms engage in such strategies with a strong focus on their supply chain, suggesting that their platform initiatives are biased toward supply-side economies of scale, rather than demand-side; and (3) platform strategies contribute to revenue and/or profit growth only when they are combined with a priority attached to the demand-side of the business (i.e. customers, instead of the supply chain), typically through the unbundling or rebundling of products or services, and are part of an offensive digital strategy at scale. These results are robust to a Heckman-selection equation and a number of changes to the specification and key measures.
Introduction
Platform businesses have recently been penetrating a large set of industries beyond the software and media industries they originate from. This includes retail (Amazon, Alibaba), transport (Uber), hospitality (Airbnb), payment services (Paypal), or telecom operators (Skype, WhatsApp, WeChat).
In parallel, scholars have taken note, not the least because the economics of platform often involve a radically new configuration of the value chain and a disruption of established business models. Following Shapiro and Varian (1999) 's landmark book, several scholars published seminal work on the economics of multi-sided business in general and platforms in particular, such as Gawer and Cusumano (2002) , Rochet and Tirole (2003) , Eisenmann et al. (2006) and Evans and Schmalensee (2007) . Annabella Gawer edited an important book a couple of years later (Gawer, 2009) , collating several important papers on the economics and management of platform businesses. Since then, several publications on platforms have made their way into the top-selling business books. In 2016 alone, such works included Parker et al. (2016) and Evans and Schmalensee (2016) .
A defining element of platforms is the presence of network effects, by which the participation of users (on one side of the platform business) makes the platform more valuable and attractive to other users (on the same or another side). Shapiro and Varian (1999) referred to these network effects as "demand-side economies of scale". These effects induce typical strategies of platforms such as cross-subsidizing a certain category of users or a certain side of the platform markets. Once they reach a certain tipping point at the cross-subsidized side, network effects further become captive and considerably raise the switching costs, making entry extremely difficult with winnertakes-all battles (Evans and Schmalensee, 2001 ).
In theory, new entrants would play a platform game more often than an incumbent more interested in preserving its own base (Evans and Gawer, 2016) . However, the negative consequence of being disrupted by a platform entrant is likely higher for an incumbent, that may play the game as a way to pre-empt entry and reinvent itself. Johnson et al. (2008) makes the case that maintaining a business requires recognizing when it needs a fundamental change. Platform-based business models, enabled by digital technology, may help internalize the benefit of this fundamental change to an incumbent's business model. Eisenmann et al. (2011) developed the concept and theoretical foundation of a typical strategy for incumbent firms, which they call "platform envelopment". It consists for an incumbent firm in re-bundling existing functionalities to offer them across several markets or platforms.
Yet, beyond some anecdotal stories, 1 empirical evidence is lacking about the incidence of and the returns to platforms developed by incumbent firms. This paper provides a first attempt at filling this gap. First, we seek to provide some survey-based evidence on the incidence and nature of the adoption of platform strategies by incumbent firms. Second, we explore the conditions under which such strategies are adopted in general, and the ability of established firms to challenge their supplyside focus. And third, we provide some evidence on the conditions under which platform strategies contribute to firm performance.
Our empirical analysis is based on a McKinsey-designed executive survey of over 2000 incumbent companies across a wide range of geographies and industries (from a panel of 12000 firms). In a nutshell, our results suggest that (1) only 10 to 30% of incumbent firms have already engaged in 1 Daimler and BMW for instance have gained some success with their respective car sharing platforms Car2Go and DriveNow, whereas Johnson Control's Panopix platform had to be closed to external developers after 2 years of existence platform play, with substantial heterogeneity across industries, however; (2) incumbent firms engage in such strategies with a strong focus on their supply chain, suggesting that their platform initiatives are biased toward supply-side economies of scale, rather than demand-side; and (3) platform strategies contribute to revenue and/or profit growth only when they are combined with a priority attached to the demand-side of the business (i.e. customers, instead of the supply chain).
These results point at the need for incumbent firms to build the right demand-side capabilities (not necessarily digital) and to reduce their risk aversion in order to play such strategies boldly and at large, rather than on a small scale. The paper therefore calls for more research on the dynamic capabilities required to engage in platform strategies and how to develop them, as initiated recently by Leijon et al. (2017) .
The paper is organized in 4 sections. Section 2 presents the contextual framework and summarizes the state of the art on platform businesses. Section 3 describes the data, which is empirically analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical background
Different definitions of platform businesses have been proposed in the literature, by scholars including Gawer and Cusumano (2002) , Rochet and Tirole (2003) , Eisenmann et al. (2006) and Evans and Schmalensee (2007) . They are often based on the notion of a core, stable set of functions, serving as a foundation for the development of a wide range of complementary products or services, often by third-parties. More recently, Parker et al. (2016) Evans and Gawer (2016) propose a typology of platforms, organizing them in 4 categories: transaction platforms (facilitating transactions between different users, such Uber or Amazon Marketplace), innovation platforms (a technology, product or service acting as a foundation on top of which other firms develop complementary technologies, such as Apple's iOS or Microsoft Windows), integrated platforms (a combination of the former 2 categories, supporting content creation and collaboration, such as Facebook and Youtube), and investment platforms (companies running a platform portfolio strategy and acting as a holding company, active platform investor, or both, such as Priceline Group). Gawer (2009) organized platforms along a different axis based on the context in which they appear: internal platforms (used within a given firm), supply-chain platforms and industry platforms. Supplychain platforms are defined (Gawer, 2009) The singularity and strength of platform models primarily stem from network effects. Platforms are, by definition, multisided businesses, which mean that they serve as an infrastructure for interactions among different sets of stakeholders or users. As a consequence, the value of a platform derives not just from its own set of idiosyncratic features, but from the presence of potential interaction counterparts for its users. Users on one side tend to make the platform more valuable to users on the other side, and vice-versa. Jeff Bezos refers to this principle as "Amazon flywheel" (Stone, 2013) . Varian and Shapiro (1999) coined the term "demand-side economies of scale".
The key to platform growth and success is indeed to build economies of scale on the demand-side of the profit equation: technological improvements on the user side of platforms can raise efficiencies in social interactions and demand aggregation to make bigger networks more valuable to their users . Because network effects can give the largest company in a platform market an advantage that is extremely difficult for competitors to overcome , the typical entry strategy into a platform market requires revolutionary functionality to be offered (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Bresnahan, 1999) , which underlies the sequential winner-take-all battles typical of platform markets, as observed by Evans and Schmalensee (2001) , with superior new platforms replacing old ones (Eisenmann et al., 2011) .
Given the wide scope of applicability of platform businesses and the solid barriers to entry which network effects can build, incumbent firms have reason to be concerned and to react. Examples of platform plays include Accor opening a marketplace to independent hotels to compete against the aggressive of OTAs in the travel industry; or Still Schibsted, building and consolidated classified marketplaces globally. In their survey of platform businesses across the world, Evans and Gawer (2016) Leijon et al. (2017) further investigate the case of 4 incumbent firms' incursion into the area of digital platforms. Eisenmann et al. (2011) highlight an alternative strategy, which they call "platform envelopment". It consists in bundling functionalities from different platforms into one, thereby extending the user base of one platform to an adjacent area. This is typically the case of Daimler with its multi-modal mobility platform Moovel, offering centralized access to various mobility platform providers such as its own Car2Go, but also Flinkster or Deutsche Bahn, which can be booked and paid via the Moovel app.
Yet, demand-side economies of scale (i.e. network effects) involve a significant departure from traditional business models, which often excel at building and maximizing supply-side economies of scale. Such a shift of focus may require new capabilities for incumbents to develop, as pointed out by Leijon et al. (2017) . Specifically, they discuss the difficulty of opening up to external value creation and the resistance it may trigger. To handle the tensions between internal and external, their 4 case companies ended up with specialized ecosystem setups. In short, their argument is that the shift from products to platforms requires opening up the value creation process and giving away some degree of control and planning over innovation and value creation.
Traditional firms will therefore face a tough challenge in their attempts to develop a platform business: acquiring the capabilities needed to build demand-side economies of scale and grow in size rapidly enough to build protective network effects. We derive our first set of hypotheses directly from this assumption:
Hypothesis 1a: traditional firms are more likely to engage in platform strategies when they perceive a larger risk of disruption by digital innovators.
By the arguments developed in the literature about platform business models, their profit equation rests on demand-side economies of scale. We therefore expect the contribution of a platform strategy to the performance of incumbent firms to depend upon the successful development of such network effects on the demand side. Given that such network effects are costly to build (consider the cash burn of successful platforms such as Amazon and Facebook in their early years) and become protective only beyond a certain tipping point (Gawer, 2009) , their profitability should depend on their growth past such a tipping point. Eisenmann et al. (2011) 's theory of platform envelopment further suggests that developing a platform through the bundling of existing functionalities may be a successful strategy for incumbents facing the threat of platform disruption. From these observations, we infer the two following hypotheses: 
Data
Our empirical analysis relies on survey data. The survey was run by TNS in 2016 on behalf of McKinsey within a representative panel of 12,000 C-suite executives across industries and regions. Conducted every year for almost a decade, the survey covers a variety of business issues. Earlier waves of the survey have been used in different research efforts, including Brynjolfsson et al. (2011) and Bughin (2016) .
The 2016 edition of the survey covers the firms' perception of digitization in their industry and how they responded to it. The sample for our analysis, described at length in Bughin et al. (2017) and Bughin and van Zeebroeck (2017a) , is made up of 2135 firms. 2 The data further include a number of firm-level observables, which we control for. These controls include proxies for the region, size, industry and type of activities (mono/multi products/services). Roughly 43% of companies have their headquarters in Europe, versus 30% in the US; one third of the firms in the sample have sales in excess of $1 billion; 62% are privately owned, 35% are primarily B2C firms, and the most represented sectors are high tech (22%), financial services (20%), and professional services (20%).
Measuring the adoption of a platform model
Our identification of platform players is based on the responses to the following question: "Turning to your organization's goals for digital going forward, which of the following are the most important objectives of its digital strategy?" The survey offered 6 options, among which up to 3 could be ranked in order of priority: Table 1 reports the frequency of each of these options as ranked by respondents. It shows that incumbent firms focus their top priority on better serving their current customers through un-or re-bundling, developing new offerings or serving new customer segments, and distributing through digital channels with equal frequencies (about 22%). Cost cutting and platform play are almost two times less frequently cited as top priorities, whereas access to new sources of supply (such as ride sharing or room sharing) are barely cited by 2% of the responding incumbents.
Frequency of being cited among top 3 priority
Frequency of being cited as top 1 priority Better serving existing customers (through bundling or customization) 62% 23%
New products/services or customers 55% 21%
New sources of supply 13% 2%
Digital distribution channels 57% 22%
Cost cutting or downscaling (e.g. automation) 45% 13%
Reconfigure the value chain (platform play) 32% 12% 
Measuring firm performance
Our analysis uses two different measures of performance: revenue growth and profit margin growth. Both of them are self-reported in the survey, in the form of 12 buckets (5% wide for most of them), spanning from -50% or more to +50% or more. Both measures exhibit a unique mode at the [5%;9%] bucket. The buckets are numbered in ascending order from 1 to 12. This implies that a one unit increase in the variable corresponds to a jump by one bucket. Since buckets are between 4 and 5% wide, such a jump around the mean represents a 4.5 percentage points increase in the growth rate.
Measuring the focus on the demand-side
In order to capture the demand-side orientation of the focal firm in its digital efforts, we created a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has included the following statement in its 3 top digital priorities: "Better serving the needs of current customers (e.g., unbundling or rebundling existing products or services, providing more opportunities for customization)." As shown in Table 1 , this is the case for 62% of the respondents. We then interact this dummy with our measure of platform play. Overall, among the platform adopters in our sample (12% of the total sample of firms), there are exactly as many firms combining their platform play with such a demand-side focus as not. Following H2a, we expect the interaction term to be positively and significantly associated with firm performance.
Measuring the scale of digital efforts
To investigate our second set of hypotheses, we use Bughin and van Zeebroeck (2017a)'s measures of digital reactions among incumbent firms. It consists in a 4-level scale from weak (no strategic change or significant investment in digital technology) and medium reactions (limited change to corporate strategy or average investment in digital) to semi-bold (significant change to corporate strategy OR significant overinvestment in digital) and bold-at-scale (significant change to corporate strategy AND significant overinvestment in digital). Bughin and van Zeebroeck (2017a) have observed a linear relationship between their measure of digital reactions and the growth of firm revenues and profit margins, with the bold-at-scale group being the only one able to compensate the depressive effect of digitization in their environment. In our sample, there are 15% firms in this bold-at-scale group of digital players. Among platform players, 24% qualify as bold-at-scale players. Following H2b, we would expect the interaction of the strongest level of reaction (bold-at-scale) with platform play to be significantly contributing to firm performance.
Empirical implementation and results

Which incumbent firms engage in platform play?
Before looking at our hypotheses, we first look at the incidence and character of platform players among incumbent firms. A basic descriptive analysis reveals some interesting patterns. First, platform play is found in only a fraction of incumbent firms: only 12% of our sample of firms report platforms as their top priority (32% list platforms among their top 3 priorities, however). There is substantial heterogeneity among industries, as reported in Looking at firm characteristics, Table 3 compares the share of platform players among different cuts of incumbents. Most differences are not significant, except for B2B v. B2C firms: 13% of firms with a primary B2B focus have engaged into platforms, v. 8% only for firms with a primary focus on B2C. This result is appealing in itself, given the above discussion on popular platforms, which mostly involve consumers and demand-side network effects, and is consistent with our first hypothesis. Turning to our first hypothesis, related with the strategic orientations of traditional firms engaging into a platform play, our empirical strategy consists in estimating the influence of various elements of a firm's strategic reaction to digitization on their likelihood of developing a platform. We estimate these effects in a logit model with platform play as (dummy) dependent variable. Specifically, we consider 2 dimensions: the perception by the focal firm of digital disruption in its environment, and the strategic orientation of the focal firm's reaction to digital turbulence. Their respective estimated coefficients are reported in column 2 and 3 of Table 4 respectively. Column 1 in the table reports the estimation of a model with control variables only and the last columns report the results for a full model with all variables at once. A number of patterns emerge from these results.
First, looking at column 2, platform strategies are significantly triggered by the perceived threat of digital disruption, in line with hypothesis 1a. However, this is particularly so when digital threatens the supply chain. This suggests that platform adoption among incumbent firms is disproportionately viewed as a way to react to digital disruption on the supply side. Second, looking at column 3, platform play is significantly associated with 2 particular strategic orientations: it is negatively associated with the adaptation of products, services and channels to customers' needs and preferences, and positively associated with an increased speed of operations in businesses and functions.
These results hold in a specification including all explanatory factors (in column 4). They are also robust to perimeter changes in the dependent variable, as reported in columns 5 and 6. In column 5, the dependent variable (platform adoption) is set to 1 as soon as the focal firm lists platform play among its top 3 digital priorities. 5 In Column 6, firms are considered as platform players if they include either the core strategy ("Redefining the industry's value chain…") or the access to new sources of supply such as ride or room sharing as their top digital priority. In both cases, the above findings hold qualitatively, modulo some differences in significance levels. A few additional factors turn significant too with these alternative measures of the dependent variable, which were all identically signed but not significant with the default definition of platform adoption: "New relationships created with external business partners", "New models of sharing profits and value with external businesses" and "Proactive adaptation of business model, even at risk of cannibalization" turn significantly positive in one or two of these specifications. All of these are consistent with a supply-side focus and inconsistent with a demand-side priority.
These results add to the earlier observation about the disproportionate amount of B2B firms among platform players, which is itself confirmed by our logit estimates (in column 1), as the parameter associated with a B2C focus is consistently negative across all specifications and significant in the control-only model (it is significant at the 20% probability level in all others).
The picture that emerges from these statistics is more consistent with our first hypothesis than with the view of platform strategy as a way to build demand-side economies of scale by focusing on a new relationship with consumers. On the contrary, we observe that incumbent firms engaging in platforms have a disproportionate focus on B2B and on their supply chain, with little attention to 4 Note that including each dimension of digital one by one in distinct regressions yields the same conclusion: only the overall perception of digitization and the perception of digital turbulence in the supply chain turn out positive and significant. All other dimensions (distribution channels, competitive landscape and core operations) are not significant at any conventional level. 5 Instead of the first priority in the default specification.
end-customers and digital channels. This might be a sign that supply-chain platforms are an easier game to play for incumbent firms.
Do platform strategies contribute to firm performance?
We finally explore our second set of hypotheses (the contribution of platform strategies to firm performance) in an econometric model that builds on Bughin and van Zeebroeck (2017a) . Specifically, we aim to estimate , which reflects the elasticity of firm performance to the adoption of a platform strategy as in equation 1.
Where: Y ij is the performance of firm i in its industry j. P i is a binary variable equal to 1 if firm i has adopted a platform strategy and 0 otherwise, and X i is a set of controls at the firm level. Likewise Bughin and van Zeebroeck (2017a), we normalize each variable by differencing out its industry average.
To test H2a and H2b, we need to interact our variable P i with a measure of the focus on customer service improvement (i.e. on the demand-side), CF i and with a measure of the intensity of digital efforts, Z ij (the strategic digital reaction of firm i), as in equation 2. Our hypotheses H2a and H2b are essentially a test of >0 and >0 respectively.
We estimate equations 1 and 2 using OLS. 6 The results are reported in Tables 5 and 6 with revenue growth and profit margin growth as dependent variables respectively. We include the different terms one by one, starting with a model including digital reactions and controls only, which we call "Baseline" (column 1). In general, our results replicate those of Bughin and van Zeebroeck (2017a) : the stronger the digital reaction (from weak to bold-at-scale), the larger the benefit in terms of performance. In contrast, in columns 2 and 3 (which report the estimates of equation 1), our measure of platform adoption is not significantly associated with firm performance. At face value, this suggests therefore that platform strategies do not pay off, neither are they detrimental to firm performance. This neutral effect of platform strategies may nonetheless hide substantial heterogeneity, as predicted by our hypotheses, which we explore next. Looking at H2a first, the results in column 5 highlight a strongly significant and positive contribution of platform play on both performance measures when combined with a digital focus on better serving the needs of existing clients, typically through bundling or customization. This result holds in the full model reported in column 6 (for both performance measures). These results are consistent with our hypothesis.
We finally turn to H2b, which predicts that platform strategies should be beneficial only when part of a bold at scale digital strategy. Let's first recall that the "bold at scale" dummy capture firms that reacted to digitization in an offensive way with significant overinvestments in digital technology compared with their peers. We test this hypothesis by estimating equation 2, which includes an interaction term between the platform dummy (P i in equation 2) and the strongest category of reaction (Z ij in equation 2). The results are reported in column 3 of Tables 5 and 6. The positive and significant coefficient associated with the interaction term clearly supports the view that platform strategies only pay-off when part of an ambitious, corporate-level, strategy. This result, however, only shows up with revenue growth as dependent variable, not with profit margin growth, suggesting that scale in platform strategies is revenue-enhancing, but not necessarily profitenhancing. Profit contributions rely more on the customer orientation of the platform initiative. This result is also consistent with the theory of platform envelopment of Eisenmann et al. (2011) , which suggest that incumbent firms can engage in platform strategies by bundling existing products, services or functionalities.
We find further support to these findings in columns 7 and 8 of the same table 5, which report subsample regressions of the full model. In column 7, the sample is limited to non-platform players, whereas column 8 is run only on platform players. As it can be seen, the customer orientation is significant and positive with platform players, but not with non-platform players, confirming that customer orientation is a must when playing a platform strategy. This result qualitatively holds in the EBIT growth model (columns 7 and 8 of table 6).
In contrast, whereas the bold-at-scale level of reaction is dominant in both subsamples, lower levels of digital reaction (medium or semi-bold) are significantly contributing to revenue growth among non-platform players, but not among platform players, supporting the idea that platform play, more so than other types of digital strategies, require a bold and at scale commitment. This latter result is less marked but also qualitatively holds in the EBIT growth model.
Exploring robustness
We have tested the robustness of our results in different ways. We first run a Heckman selection model, in which our first set of results (determinants of platform play) are used to form our selection equation. The second and first stage results, reported in Tables 7 and 8 respectively, are in line with our main estimates. Table 8 reports a battery of extra robustness estimates. Throughout the table, odd columns are for revenue growth as dependent variable, and even columns use EBIT growth instead. The first four columns estimate equation 2 using the two alternative measures of platform play: columns 1 and 2 consider all 3 priorities (not just the first) and columns 3 and 4 extend the definition of platform play to accessing new sources of supply such as ride or room sharing. Our core results (platforms pay off only when combined with bold-at-scale digital strategies and/or with a strong customer focus) hold qualitatively true, although significance is not always achieved, especially with the EBIT rate growth as dependent variable.
Columns 5 to 8 report subsample estimates with two specific sectors: financial services (columns 5 and 6) and high-tech & telecom (columns 7 and 8). The result on customer focus is robust in both sectors. The bold-at-scale interaction only holds in the financial sector, not in high tech and telecom.
Columns 9 and 10 provide additional support to hypothesis H2a by considering which C-level executive is sponsoring the digital initiatives within the company: the CEO, the CFO or the CMO (CIO/CDO serves as the reference). Each C-level sponsor is interacted with our core explanatory variable (platform play). It turns out that only the sponsorship of the Chief Marketing Officer has a positive and significant mediating effect on the platform-performance relationship. This positive effect is however limited to revenue -not profit -growth.
Finally, columns 11 and 12 test the sensitivity of our results to an alternative regression model, using a censored tobit (our dependent variables -due to their coding -are bounded in the [-8 ;+8] range). The results are robust.
Discussion and conclusions
Platforms are receiving traction and raising concerns across an ever-wider range of industries. Once the prerogative of innovative digital start-ups and unicorns, they are increasingly considered and launched by incumbent firms, with some visible successes, although anecdotal. BMW and Daimler's respective car sharing initiatives (DriveNow and Car2Go respectively) seem to be paying off quite well. Johnson Control, in contrast, had to close its platform Panoptix to external developers for lack of traction. However, empirical evidence on the magnitude of incumbent platforms as well as on their character and productivity effects is dramatically lacking. The present paper provides a first step in addressing this gap.
First, it documents the phenomenon by showing that some 8 to 20% of incumbent firms are engaging in some platform initiatives to a certain extent, with substantial cross-industry variation. Second, it provides suggestive evidence that platform strategies tend to be played by incumbent firms with an "old-world" mindset, disproportionately focused on supply-side economies of scale. Finally, the paper further provides suggestive evidence that this is the wrong focus: platforms payoff more when they are designed to build demand-side economies of scale, aka network effects, by focusing on the demand-side of the profit equation, and part of an ambitious and offensive digital strategy. Overinvestment in digital technology, combined with an offensive strategic move (as advocated by Bughin and van Zeebroeck (2017b) ), is required to build and internalize network effects. With other words, scale in digital investments matter in order to go beyond the "tipping point" in the development of network effects. This is even more of a must when the threat of disruption is stronger, and digital competition potentially larger, pleading for a differentiated approach in platform play.
Our results suggest that successful platform play requires two key elements: being part of a broader digital strategy that is bold and played at scale (consistently with the main result of Bughin and van Zeebroeck (2017a) ), and being combined with a strong focus on customer experience and service, typically through bundling or customization. These are two difficult prerequisites for established firms. The former (bold-at-scale digital strategies) requires a mix of ambition (building digital solutions and models at scale) and courage (since the risk is cannibalizing existing profit pools), and most certainly some risk-taking. The latter requires a change of mindset and most likely the acquisition of new capabilities focused on demand-side rather than supply-side economies of scale. This is not a digital capability per se, but a cultural mindset. Leijon et al. (2017) offer some insights into the main obstacles faced by incumbent firms engaging in platform strategies. Specifically, they discuss the difficulty of opening up to external value creation and the resistance it may trigger. To handle the tensions between internal and external, their 4 case companies ended up with specialized ecosystem setups. In short, their argument is that the shift from products to platforms requires opening up the value creation process and giving away some degree of control and planning over innovation and value creation. In this view, one plausible explanation for our result is that incumbent firms find it easier to open up these processes to their traditional supply chain than to their end consumers, hence their supply-chain bias in their platform initiatives. More research is however needed to better understand how incumbent firms should proceed to adapt their culture to a world of digital platforms. Tables   Table 4 The reference is a private firm with revenues smaller than $1 billion with a main focus on B2B, and multiple services in its portfolio. All OLS estimates, except columns 11 and 12 (Tobit) 
